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INTRODUCTION
Under current Virginia law, "only the actual perpetrator of a capital
murder is eligible for the death penalty;"1 in other words, only the
person who committed the physical act of murder, or "pulled the
trigger," is eligible for the death penalty in Virginia. 2 The Virginia
General Assembly has passed, for the third year in a row, a bill to expand
this rule.3 House Bill 2358, identical to Senate Bill 961, proposes to
amend section 18.2-18 of the Virginia Code, allowing the
Commonwealth to charge principals in the second degree and accessories
before the fact as principals in the first degree under certain
circumstances. 4 Virginia Governor Timothy M. Kaine, however, vetoed
the bill for the second year in a row. 5
This Comment will examine the legislative history of the triggerman
rule in Virginia in Part I. Part II will explore the justifications and
criticisms of an expansion to the triggerman rule. Part III will present a
short study of American jurisprudence with respect to the death penalty
and non-triggermen. Finally, Part IV will discuss the future implications
for Virginia's criminal justice system if the expansion to the triggerman
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rule eventually becomes law.
PART I
The Virginia General Assembly enacted the triggerman rule in 1977. 6
In 1979, the Supreme Court of Virginia held, in Coppola v.
Commonwealth,7 that "only the immediate perpetrator of a homicide,
the one who fired the fatal shot, and not an accessory before the fact or
a principal in the second degree, may be convicted of capital murder
under the provisions of Code [section] 18.2-31, as qualified by Code
[section] 18.2-18." 8 In the years that followed, however, the General
Assembly began to expand the circumstances under which the
Commonwealth may try an individual for capital murder. In 1981, the
General Assembly introduced gradation elements by adding subsection
seven to section 18.2-31 of the Code of Virginia, 9 which allows the
imposition of the death penalty on someone who was the principal in
the first degree in one murder and at least an accomplice in a second
murder or another accompanying offense defined in section 18.2-31 of
the Virginia Code.10 Initially extending only to principals in the second
degree and accessories before the fact in cases of killing for hire, the
General Assembly subsequently amended section 18.2-18 to allow the
Commonwealth to try these parties for capital murder in acts of
terrorism11 and continuing criminal enterprise.1 2 The Virginia Supreme
Court also restated that "triggerman" means an "immediate perpetrator"
to the crime. 13
The recent impetus in Virginia for expanding the triggerman rule grew
6. See Act of Mar. 29, 1977, ch. 478, 1977 Va. Acts 714; see also Rae K. Inafuku, Comment,
Coleman v. Thompson-Sacrificing Fundamental Rights in Deference to the States: The Supreme
Court's 1991 Interpretation of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 625, 627 n.10
(1994).
7. 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979).
8. Id. at 256, 257 S.E.2d at 806 (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 146, 150, 255 S.E.2d 525,
527 (1979)).
9. See Act of Apr. 1, 1981, ch. 607, 1981 Va. Acts 1280.
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Cum. Supp. 2008); Hammand S. Matin, Expansion of Section 18.2-
31 of the Virginia Code, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 7, 24 (1999); Philip H. Yoon, Note, Code of Virginia, 15 CAP.
DEF. J. 273, 276 n.31 (2002); see also William J. Dinkin & Cullen D. Seltzer, Criminal Law and
Procedure, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 537, 554-55 (2001) (stating that capital murder is a "gradation crime"
in which the Commonwealth must only prove that the defendant was the "triggerman" in the principal
murder).
11. Act of Apr. 6, 2002, ch. 588, 2002 Va. Acts 810.
12. Act of Mar. 13, 1997, ch. 313, 1997 Va. Acts 456.
13. Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 483, 619 S.E.2d 16, 34 (2005).
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out of the prosecutorial difficulties in the 2002 Washington area sniper
cases. 14  Two men, Lee Boyd Malvo ("Malvo") and John Allen
Muhammad ("Muhammad"), shot sixteen people,15 and "[b]ecause it was
initially unclear who pulled the trigger, prosecutors said they were
hampered in efforts to have the mastermind, John Allen Muhammed,
executed." 16 In motions to dismiss Muhammed's capital murder charges,
the defense argued that: (1) Muhammed was not eligible for the death
penalty because there was no evidence he pulled the trigger or directed
Malvo to do so; and (2) the terrorism provision was not intended to
apply in such a case.17 In the absence of the terrorism exception to the
Virginia triggerman rule, the defense argued the prosecution was
essentially "asking [the] judge to expand the ... law to include someone
who may be a puppeteer." 18 Interestingly, the trial judge ruled that "the
prosecution produced enough evidence to show that [Muhammad] could
have been a principal in the first degree," and convicted and sentenced
Muhammed to death. 19  The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld
Muhammad's conviction and sentence under the expanded section 18.2-
18.20 While section 18.2-18 did not apply to traditional "aiders and
abettors," the court agreed that it did apply to a criminal actor who
"orders" or "directs" the killing and shared the intent to kill. 2 1  The
court elaborated, "It is the actual participation together in a unified act
that permits two or more persons to be immediate perpetrators. '22
Virginia House Bill 2358, which is identical to Senate Bill 961, would
allow a principal in the second degree to be tried and punished as the
principal in the first degree in all cases of capital murder, if he had the
same intent to kill as the principal in the first degree. 23 Further, the bill
would permit an accessory before the fact to be tried and punished as a
principal in the first degree if he ordered or directed a willful, deliberate,
14. Somashekhar, supra note 2.
15. See Muhammed, 269 Va. at 467-68, 619 S.E.2d at 24-25.
16. Somashekhar, supra note 2.
17. See Muhammed, 269 Va. at 490, 619 S.E.2d at 38; Linda A. Malone, From Breard to Atkins to
Malvo: Legal Incompetency and Human Rights Norms on the Fringes of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 363, 397 (2004).
18. Malone, supra note 17, at 397 n.249.
19. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
20. Muhammad, 269 Va. at 481-84, 619 S.E.2d at 24.
21. MATTHEW Ross LIPPMAN, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS, CASES, AND
CONTROVERSIES 608 (2007).
22. Muhammed, 269 Va. at 484, 619 S.E.2d at 35.
23. See H.B. 2358, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 18.2-18 (as enrolled Mar. 9, 2009); S.B.





Political proponents of the expansion to the triggerman rule include
the Virginia Crime Commission, 25 reversing its 2006 stance that a
similar bill was too broad.26 Advocates say but for "the creative efforts
of prosecutors," Muhammad might have avoided the death penalty
because he was not the triggerman and the phrase "immediate
perpetrator" has normally been applied only to an accomplice who
physically participates in the killing. 27 Proponents also named other
instances of "loopholes" in which the accomplice was not sentenced to
capital punishment. 28 Advocates for the repeal of the triggerman rule
point out that someone who "participates" in a killing may be as
culpable as someone who "carries it out. ' 29 The bill's sponsor, Virginia
Senator Mark D. Obenshain 3 said in 2007:
There are clearly situations where people are as culpable
and blackhearted as the person who pulls the trigger ....
If one person has a gun and the other person does not,
and the person without the gun said: "Shoot her. Shoot
that teller," without the triggerman rule, the person who
is directing the killing would not be eligible for capital
murder. With this bill, they would.31
Meanwhile, political opponents caution against expanding the death
penalty in a state already ranked second in the nation based on number
of executions behind Texas. 32 The American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") of Virginia argues the bill is "more than a symbolic expansion
24. See H.B. 2358, § 18.2-18; S.B. 961, § 18.2-18.
25. WHSV.com, Obenshain's Triggerman Bill Passes, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.whsv.com/news/
headlines/40307617.html (last visited Apr. 19. 2009).
26. Chris L. Jenkins, House Votes to Repeal "Triggerman Rule," WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at B8.
27. Associated Press, "Triggerman" Bill Sent to Kaine, INSIDENoVA.cOM, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://www.insidenova.com/isn/news/politics/article/triggerman bill sent to kaine/4882/ (last visited
Apr. 19, 2009).
28. Id. ("For example, Brandon Hedrick was executed in July 2006 for the rape and murder of a
woman in Appomattox County while an accomplice only got life in prison.").
29. A. Barton Hinkle, Candidates Split (Sort of) Over Capital Punishment, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH
(Va.), Feb. 13, 2009, at A13.
30. Republican Senator Mark D. Obenshain represents Senate District 26. See Legislative
Information System, Bill Tracking: Members, 2009 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/091/mbr/MBR.htm
(last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
31. Tim Craig, Broader Scope for Execution Approved, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2007, at B2.
32. See Nolan, supra note 1.
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of the death penalty" and "could result in a resurgence of death penalty
convictions and executions in Virginia. '33 The director of the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse, David I. Bruck, stated that expanding the
triggerman rule will "mak[e] the death penalty available in more cases
and guarantees [Virginia] will make more mistakes. '34 There are already
fifteen "predicate" crimes for the death penalty in Virginia,35 and
previous expansions to what constitutes capital murder have been
"specific and narrow in scope. ' 36  Virginia Delegate Joseph D.
Morrissey, 37 a former prosecutor, argued that Virginia should reserve the
death penalty for only the most egregious of killers and that it does not
make sense to continue expanding capital punishment "to include every
single garden variety type of killing. ' 38 Delegate Morrissey also stated
that the expansions stem from a desire to appear "tough on crime" in
election years. 39 Even vigorous supporters of the death penalty, such as
ultraconservative Virginia Senator Ken Cuccinelli, 40 oppose the abolition
of the triggerman rule.41  Senator Cuccinelli offered the following
counter-hypothetical to Senator Obenshain's hypothetical 42 to explain
his opposition to the expansion of the triggerman rule: "What if two
guys go into [a] bank and one shoots five tellers while the other one
stands there thinking, 'Why did he do that?' It's going to look to the
jury like they were executing a plan, and he's going to be executed like
the first guy."'43
PART III
Approximately three-fifths of the jurisdictions within the United
33. WILLIS, supra note 3.
34. Craig, supra note 31.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
36. VIRGINIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY, THE FACTS ON REDEFINING THE
TRIGGERMAN RULE: VOTE No ON SB 961 & HB 2358, http://www.vadp.org/death-penalty-expansion-
elimination-of-the-triggerman-rule-sb-96 1 -amp-hb-2358.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
37. Democrat Joseph D. Morrissey represents House District 74. See Legislative Information System,
Bill Tracking: Members, 2009 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/091/mbr/MBR.htm (last visited Apr. 19,
2009).
38. Joseph D. Morrissey, Editorial, Virginia Doesn't Need Death Penalty Expansion, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Va.), Feb. 26, 2009, at A13.
39. Id.
40. Republican Ken T. Cuccinelli, II represents Senate District 37. See Legislative Information
System, Bill Tracking: Members, 2009 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/091/mbr/MBR.htm (last visited
Apr. 19, 2009).
41. See Morrissey, supra note 38.
42. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
43. Hinkle, supra note 29.
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States that have not abolished the death penalty outright do not
authorize capital punishment absent a finding that the non-triggerman
intended to kill.44  Virginia is one of three states that has capital
punishment but does not apply it to accomplices sharing the intent to
kill.45 Death penalty statutes, practically applied, have not resulted in a
single execution since Enmund v. Florida,46 in which the defendant did
not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victim. 47
The Supreme Court of the United States's decisions related to the
death penalty and specifically to non-triggermen have been inconsistent
and ambiguous. In 1972, the Court held, in Furman v. Georgia,48 that
the imposition of the death penalty in instances where the court or jury
had unbridled discretion resulted in outcomes that were arbitrary,
discriminatory, and capricious and constituted cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. 49
In response to Furman, legislatures adopted statutes that imposed
mandatory death sentences or implemented guided discretion. 0 The
United States Supreme Court, however, struck down mandatory death
sentences as unconstitutional in 1976 in Roberts v. Louisiana51 and
Woodson v. North Carolina.12 Subsequently, in Coker v. Georgia,53 the
Court established guidelines for the imposition of the death penalty. 54
The Court stated that the punishment is "excessive" and
unconstitutional if it: "(1) makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. '55 Further, the
Court stressed that "attention must be given to the public attitudes
concerning a particular sentence-history and precedent, legislative
attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing
44. EVAN J. MANDERY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A BALANCED EXAMINATION 296 (2004).
45. Associated Press, supra note 27.
46. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
47. See MANDERY, supra note 44.
48. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
49. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam); Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
50. Douglas W. Schwartz, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a Non-
Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REV. 857, 859-60 (1985).
51. 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
52. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
53. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).





In Enmund, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Earl Enmund's first-
degree murder conviction and death sentence under Florida's felony
murder rule.57 Enmund had driven the "getaway" car for Sampson and
Jeanette Armstrong, who had robbed and murdered an elderly couple. 58
The jury found Enmund guilty because he had been present and actively
aided and abetted the robbery. 59  The Supreme Court of the United
States, in a plurality opinion, reversed the conviction and concluded:
the Eighth Amendment [does not] permit the imposition
of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids
and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is
committed by others but who does not himself kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that
lethal force will be employed. 6
The "[E]ighth [A]mendment prohibits all punishments which by their
severity are disproportionate to the offenses charged. ' 61 The Enmund
Court determined:
[t]he Florida felony murder rule converted Enmund from
a principal in the second degree to a principal in the first
degree, equal to the status of the person who did the
actual killing. Intent was automatically inferred, but this
was wholly at odds with the individualized consideration
that must be afforded every defendant convicted of a
capital crime, during the sentencing phase of the trial.62
Ultimately, the Court in Enmund drew a bright line restricting the
type of punishment that can be inflicted, barred the death penalty in the
absence of intent, and rejected the death penalty in cases of accomplice
felony murder. 63 Soon after its holding in Enmund, Justice Marshall and
56. Id.
57. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 784-86 (1982).
58. Id. at 784-86; Schwartz, supra note 50, at 861.
59. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 861.
60. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
61. Roy Conn III, Case Note, Enmund v. Florida, 102 £Ct. 3368 (1982), 26 How. L.J. 1679, 1695
(1983).
62. Id.; see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (noting that individualized
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the particular offense is a "constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death").
63. See Conn, supra note 61, at 1696; see also Margaret Carmody Jenkins, Comment, Intent After




Justice Brennan, in their dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stewart
v. Texas,64 stated that the Court needed to clarify that states cannot
circumvent this intent requirement by imposing the death penalty based
on "the fiction of vicarious intent. '65
Enmund's holding guarantees two things: (1) there is some minimally
culpable mental state required to impose the death penalty, and (2) juries
must determine the mental state of a defendant prior to imposing the
death penalty. 66 Thus, Enmund prevents the application of cruel and
unusual punishment by ensuring that the defendant's crime is
proportional to the punishment. 67 Enmund's conviction, ultimately,
could not stand because it served no penological punitive purpose and
could not serve as retribution. 68
However, Enmund's holding retains a great deal of ambiguity. Lower
courts have construed intent to mean the defendant "contemplated" a
killing would occur, "intended 'lethal force' be used," or
"'contemplated' that 'lethal force' be used," leading to widely disparate
results in the application of Enmund's holding. 69 Lower courts have
also reached different conclusions about whether the jury must actually
consider the defendant's mental state or whether a court can find that
the evidence could have supported a jury finding-the result in
Muhammad-to permit capital punishment.70 As a result, lower courts
have been applying the death penalty in two extremes-where the
defendant had actual knowledge and intent that a killing would occur and
where the defendant should have known or foreseen a killing would
occur 7l-and everywhere in between. 72
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Enmund, stated:
the intent-to-kill requirement is crudely crafted [because]
the determination of the degree of blameworthiness is
best left to the sentencer . . While the type of mens
64. 474 U.S. 866 (1986).
65. Id. at 869 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 866.
67. Id. at 867.
68. Graham T. Stiles, Comment, North Carolina's Unconstitutional Expansion of an Ancient Maxim:
Using DWI Fatalities to Satisfy First Degree Felony-Murder, 22 CAMPBELL L. REv. 169, 201-02
(1999).
69. Schwartz, supra note 50, at 869-70.
70. Id. at 879; see Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 485, 619 S.E.2d 16, 35 (2005).
71. See Schwartz, supra note 50, at 879.
72. Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the Non-Triggerman: The
Scales of Justice Are Broken, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 123, 136 (1989).
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rea of the defendant must be considered... , it is not so
critical a factor in determining blameworthiness as to
require a finding of intent to kill in order to impose the
death penalty for felony murder.7 3
Five years later, Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion for
Tison v. Arizona,74 incorporating similar language as in her dissent in
Enmund and throwing the standard for capital punishment in cases of
non-triggermen in even greater flux. 75 In Tison, the defendants, who
were three brothers, helped their father and his cellmate escape from
prison, and when their getaway car developed a flat tire, they flagged
down a passing car for help. 76 The group kidnapped the family in the
car and eventually drove both cars into the desert. 77  While the
defendants retrieved water from the family's car, their father and his
cellmate shot and killed the family. 78  Because the defendants
participated in the escape effort, they were convicted and sentenced to
death under Arizona's accomplice liability and felony-murder statutes. 79
Instead of vacating the defendants' convictions under Enmund, the
Court created a new substantive standard for capital liability and held:
the reckless disregard for human life implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry
a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental
state, a mental state that may be taken into account in
making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct
causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal
result.80
By permitting the imposition of the death penalty for those who
have a "major participation in the felony committed, combined with
reckless indifference to human life," the Court allowed the lower courts'
misapplication of Enmund to justify the decision's expansion of the
death penalty even in the absence of an intent to kill.81
73. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
75. See id. at 158.
76. Id. at 139-40.
77. Id. at 140-41.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 139, 141-42.
80. Id. at 157-58; see Friedman, supra note 72, at 140.
81. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158; see Friedman, supra note 72, at 140-42.
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Justice Brennan's dissent in Tison argued that the majority opinion
was inconsistent with Enmund because it permitted the death penalty in
applications of the felony-murder rule and contravened the "legitimate
justifications for the imposition of capital punishment-deterrence and
retribution. ' 82  Tison, while resting on constitutionally questionable
grounds and introducing a standard potentially more subject to arbitrary
and capricious interpretation than Enmund, appears to adopt the view
that a defendant must merely be aware that a killing is foreseeable and be
a major participant in the felony. 83 The Court in Tison essentially
abandoned the traditional factors and addressed only societal views on
the specific crime and punishment. 84 It is unclear whether the Court's
holding in Tison intended to overrule Enmund; rather, it leaves the
application of the death penalty to the legislatures and courts, which will
likely result in disparate applications inconsistent with the principles
articulated in Furman and Enmund.85
PART IV
House Bill 2358, which is identical to Senate Bill 961, proposes that
accessories before the fact and principals in the second degree "may be
indicted, tried, convicted, and punished" as if they were principals in the
first degree, provided they have the same intent as the principals in the
first degree. 86 The amendment is superfluous because section 18.2-31
already permits "immediate perpetrators"-those inseparably
intertwined with the criminal act-to be sentenced to death, as clarified
82. Friedman, supra note 72, at 142-43 (citing Tison, 481 U.S. at 172-73).
83. Id. at 144-45, 147-49.
84. Id. at 151. Generally, the Court considered other factors in the balancing approach, including:
(1) the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty; (2) an individualized
consideration of the defendant's culpability; (3) whether the punishment is
disproportionate to the severity of the crime; (4) whether the punishment is an
affront to human dignity; and (5) whether the punishment contributes to the two
social purposes of the death penalty-retribution and deterrence.
Id.
85. See Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Note, Overstepping Precedent? Tison v. Arizona Imposes the Death
Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C. L. REV. 817, 835 (1988).
86. H.B. 2358, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 18.2-18 (as enrolled Mar. 9, 2009); S.B. 961,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 18.2-18 (as enrolled Mar. 4, 2009). This does not include
cases involving capital murder for hire, capital murder involving a continuing criminal enterprise, or
capital murder involving an act of terrorism where accessories before the fact and principals in the
second degree may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished as a principals in the first degree
without the same intent. See H.B. 2358, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 18.2-18 (as enrolled
Mar. 9,2009); S.B. 961, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009), § 18.2-18 (as enrolled Mar. 4, 2009).
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by the Supreme Court of Virginia. 87 Where a defendant actually urged a
killing, as suggested by Senator Obenshain's hypothetical, 88 the act
would likely fall under existing law as an immediate perpetrator. Thus, it
is not clear whether the proposed law even reaches the types of
perpetrators Senator Obenshain describes or whether it would be
constitutional, because a finding of a "desire" to kill coupled with direct
physical action or participation in the actual murder better comports
with the Eighth Amendment's requirements. 89  These requirements
would also restore the proportionality required between the criminal act
and the punishment. 9 Because the proposed bill requires "intent" alone,
it stands on tenuous constitutional grounds and would surely result in
arbitrary and capricious convictions and sentences. The proposed bill
could also essentially result in the mandatory impositions of the death
penalty deemed unconstitutional in Roberts and Woodson.91
CONCLUSION
Despite Governor Kaine's veto, 92 the expansion of the triggerman
rule promises to be an issue in upcoming years. The Virginia General
Assembly must remain cautious of overstepping the bounds of United
States Supreme Court cases that define the parameters of the death
penalty's constitutional application. 93 The legislature should also avoid
an expansion of the death penalty that could lead to more mistaken
convictions when existing law can already address the circumstances in
which principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact
should be subject to capital punishment.
87. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Cum. Supp. 2008); Muhammed v. Virginia, 269 Va. 451, 483, 619
S.E.2d 16, 34 (2005).
88. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
89. Friedman, supra note 72, at 154.
90. See id. at 154-55.
91. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976).
92. See Legislative Information System, Bill Tracking: HB2358, http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?ses=09&typ=bil&val=hb2358 (last visited Apr. 21, 2009); Legislative Information
System, Bill Tracking: SB961, http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?ses=09&typ=bil&val=sb961
(last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
93. See supra Part III.
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